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#2A-8/16/90 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NIAGARA FALLS POLICE CLUB, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-10901 
CITY OF NIAGARA FALLS, 
Respondent. 
DIXON, DeMARIE and SCHOENBORN, P.C. (ANTHONY J. DeMARIE, 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Charging Party 
DOUGLAS J. CROWLEY, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
By decision dated April 20, 1990, an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) found the City of Niagara Falls (City) to have 
violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment 
Act (Act) when it refused to execute an agreement, or 
otherwise respond to a request to do so, proffered by the 
Niagara Falls Police Club (Club) for the years 1987, 1988 and 
1989. 
In 1987, following issuance of an interest arbitration 
award for that year, the parties agreed that they would: 
execute a completely revised collective 
bargaining agreement to include terms and 
conditions of employment contained in the 
interest arbitration panel award and all 
previously existing terms and conditions 
of employment, in a revised form, which 
would simplify the agreement and provide 
an easier understanding for the employees 
covered by the contract. 
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Shortly thereafter, on December 1, 1987, the Club submitted 
to the City a proposed agreement for its review and possible 
execution. Apparently on its own initiative, the Club 
submitted revised proposed agreements on January 22, 1988 and 
February 18, 1988, which made corrections to the original 
draft. 
Having received no proposals from the City for 
amendment, correction, or change in the proposed agreement, 
nor an executed copy of the proposed agreement, the Club made 
written inquiries on March 30, 1988, September 1, 1988, 
December 5, 1988 and April 7, 1989, about the status of the 
proposed agreement, whether any changes were sought, and, if 
not, when the agreement would be executed. 
On April 20, 1989, representatives of the Club were 
informed that the proposed agreement was rejected because it 
contained "substantial changes", which, however, were 
unspecified. The instant improper practice charge ensued. 
During the course of proceedings before the AKJ, the 
City asserted that the proposed agreement presented to it 
some 16 months earlier contained substantive changes not 
contemplated or agreed upon by the parties. However, it 
failed to specify the respects in which it contended that the 
proposed agreement differed substantively from the expired 
1986 agreement and interest arbitration panel awards intended 
to be incorporated together into a single document. 
\ Board - U-10901 -3 
Based upon the City's failure to identify the 
substantive changes upon which it relied to support its 
refusal to execute the proffered agreement in either its 
answer or at the pre-hearing conference held in this matter, 
the ALJdirected--the City—to submit an offer of proof 
identifying the relied upon changes following the pre-
hearing conference. Upon the failure of the City to do so, 
the ALJ closed the record and issued the decision which is 
now before us on review. 
At the outset, we note that the City does not deny that 
it agreed to enter into and execute an agreement 
incorporating the terms of the parties' expired 1986 
agreement and the terms of the interest arbitration panel 
awards into a single, revised, simplified agreement. We 
concur with the ALJ's finding that at the point when the City 
agreed to develop a unified agreement the duty to negotiate 
in good faith required by §209-a.l(d) of the Act attached, 
with its attendant responsibilities to communicate, meet at 
reasonable times and places, and attempt in good faith to 
reach an agreement, to be executed on demand. In the instant 
case, the City failed, for a period of some 16 months, to 
respond in any fashion to the agreement proffered by the 
Club, which purported to reflect the parties' agreement to 
prepare and execute a unified agreement. The City also 
failed to identify its objections, if any, to the proposed 
agreement, even in the face of the instant charge and in the 
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instant proceedings. This failure to communicate or to 
submit counter-proposals or objections to the Association's 
proposal without any reasonable explanation, or, indeed, any 
explanation at all,!/ constitutes a failure to negotiate in 
good faith — 
In its exceptions before this Board, the City 
identifies, for the first time, by way of example, in what 
manner it contends that the proffered agreement differs from 
the terms of the 1986 agreement and/or interest arbitration 
panel awards. It also asserts that it was the responsibility 
of the ALT to review the documentary evidence before her, 
without need for specification of differences by the City, to 
determine whether in fact differences exist between the two 
sets of documents before reaching a determination on the 
merits of the charge. We disagree. In view of the City's 
agreement to the preparation and ultimate execution of a 
revised unified agreement,2/ there is no reason to assume 
-i/The club alleges in its charge that the City's Director of 
Labor Relations orally informed the Club's representative in 
April, 1988 that the agreement proffered in December, 1987 
was satisfactory, an allegation denied by the City in its 
answer. In view of the City's denial of the allegation, we 
exclude it from our consideration and deem the record to 
contain no response at all to the request for consideration 
and execution of the December, 1987 agreement. 
•2/In its exceptions, the City denies having made such a 
commitment, although it failed to make such denial in its 
answer to the charge. The ALJ accordingly deemed the 
allegation admitted, and relied upon it as fact in issuing 
) her decision and recommended order. Based upon our review of 
the charge and answer, we affirm the ALT's finding in this 
regard. 
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that the language of the proffered agreement should or would 
be identical in language to the expired agreement or the 
interest arbitration awards, but would incorporate the 
substantive content of each. Accordingly, comparison of the 
documents by the A U as a mechanical procedure ^° ictenti"fy 
differences in language would be meaningless, even if the 
burden rested upon the ALT to find such differences. Under 
these circumstances, however, the City certainly had the 
burden of coming forward in its answer or at least, after 
being directed to do so by the AKJ, to identify those 
differences between the documents which it contended were 
substantive rather than merely cosmetic. The burden rests 
not upon the AKJ but upon the City to establish the existence 
of a defense of substantive change in the agreement 
previously reached to the charge of refusal to execute the 
agreement. That defense is established by presentation of 
evidence that specific language differences, if any, result 
in substantive changes and not unification and clarification 
of the previous agreements. The City is not, furthermore, 
privileged to await the filing of exceptions to this Board to 
present its defense to the charge by identifying, for the 
first time, its objections to execution of the agreement. 
Such defense was not before the AKJ and is therefore not 
properly before us. The City's exception in this regard is 
accordingly denied. 
Board - U-10901 
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Based upon the foregoing, the ALT decision is affirmed, 
and IT IS ORDERED that the City: 
1. Negotiate in good faith by executing the agreement 
submitted by the Club on February 18, 1988, and 
2. Sign and- post the attached notice at all locations 
customarily used to post communications to unit 
employees. 
DATED: August 16, 1990 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memfer 
APPENDIX 
TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the unit represented by the Niagara 
Falls Police Club that the City of Niagara Falls: 
1. Will negotiate in good faith by executing 
the agreement submitted by the Niagara 
Falls Police Club on February 18, 1988. 
City of Niagara Falls 
Dated By (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WATKINS GLEN FACULTY ASSOCIATION, NYSUT, 
AFT, AFL-CIO, LOCAL #3094, 
Charging Party, 
and- CASE NO^ U^-10196 
WATKINS GLEN CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
DIANE R. McMORDIE, for Charging Party 
R. WHITNEY MITCHELL, for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Watkins 
Glen Faculty Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO, Local #3094 
(Association) to the dismissal of its improper practice 
charge against the Watkins Glen Central School District 
(District), which alleges that the District violated 
§209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees* Fair Employment Act 
(Act) when, on April 19, 1988, the Superintendent of Schools 
refused to execute an agreement presented to him following 
negotiation of an Excellence in Teaching (EIT) Fund 
distribution agreement. Thereafter, at its meeting of 
April 26, 1988, the District's Board of Education (Board) 
rejected the agreement presented by the Superintendent and 
Association representatives. 
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The Administrative Law Judge (ALT) determined that the 
foregoing action by the Board constituted a denial of 
legislative approval pursuant to the Act, which privileged 
the Superintendent's earlier refusal to sign. For the 
reasons which-followr we—reverse the"AtJ's^decrsron; 
Legislative approval is material only to the binding 
effect of certain agreements reached by the chief executive 
officer (Act §§201.12 and 204-a.l). Agreements needing 
legislative action for implementation by amendment of law or 
the provision of funding require the legislative body's 
approval before they become binding. The chief executive 
officer's duty to sign documents accurately embodying 
agreements reached in negotiations, however, extends to all 
agreements, whether or not they are subject to legislative 
approval (Act, §204.3). Legislative approval or disapproval 
is not material to a refusal to execute charge because the 
legislative body's actions in that respect bear only upon the 
ultimate enforceability of the document as signed, not the 
chief executive officer's duties, which are independent of 
the legislative body's. Material inaccuracy in the document 
tendered for signature or unsatisfied condition are viable 
defenses to a refusal to execute charge, but there is no 
claim or evidence of either on this record. Whether the 
agreements the Superintendent reached in negotiations with 
the Association are now subject to legislative approval in 
U-10196 - Board -3 
whole or in part or whether, as claimed by the Association, 
the Board has already preapproved the Superintendent * s 
agreements by its application for the EIT funds, are issues 
which are not properly before us under this charge. 
Based—upon--the foregoing^ we reverse the decision of the 
ALJ to dismiss the charge and find that the District violated 
§209-a.l(d) of the Act when its Superintendent refused, upon 
demand, to execute the agreement previously reached by the 
parties. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the District: 
1. Execute the agreement entered into with the 
Association on March 30, 1988; 
2. Post notice in the form attached at all locations 
customarily used for communications to bargaining 
unit employees. 
DATED: August 16, 1990 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Me*ber 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT^RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the Watkins Glen Central School 
District (District) in the unit represented by the Watkins 
Glen Faculty Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO, Local #3094 
(Association) that the District will execute the agreement 
entered into with the Association on March 30, 1988. 
WATKINS GLEN CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Dated By • • • • 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
#20-8/16/90 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ONEIDA COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF'S BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
-and-
SHERIFF and COUNTY OF ONEIDA, 
Respondents. 
THOMAS J. KRAJCI, for Charging Party 
SCOLARO, SHULMAN, COHEN, LAWLER & BURSTEIN, P.C. 
(BENJAMIN J. FERRARA, ESQ., of Counsel), for Respondents 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Oneida 
County Deputy Sheriff's Benevolent Association (Association) 
to the dismissal of its improper practice charge against the 
Sheriff and County of Oneida (together the Employer). The 
charge, as amended, alleges that the Employer violated §209-
a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by 
failing to commence negotiations, requested by the 
Association, within a reasonable period of time following a 
February 22, 1989 demand. 
The facts giving rise to the instant charge are not in 
dispute. What is at issue before us is whether the facts, 
taken together, establish that the Employer failed or refused 
to accede to the Association's demand to commence contract 
negotiations for an unreasonable period of time. The 
CASE NO. U-10801 
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assigned Administrative Law Judge (ALT) concluded, based upon 
the totality of circumstances, that a violation of a duty to 
negotiate in good faith had not been established. For the 
reasons which follow, we reverse the ALJ's decision and find 
that-the Employer violated—§209-a.1(d) of the—Actwhen it 
failed to commence negotiations within a reasonable period of 
time after demand therefor. 
FACTS 
In March 1988, the Employer and Association executed a 
memorandum of understanding for a collective bargaining 
agreement for the period January 1, 1987 to December 31, 
1988. As a result of disagreement concerning the language of 
one provision of the memorandum, an agreement was not finally 
executed by the parties until January 30, 1989. In the 
interim, on June 9, 1988, the Association's representative 
made written demand upon the Employer to commence 
negotiations for a successor agreement for the period 
following December 31, 1988, when the agreement then in 
dispute was in any event to expire. 
The Association received no response to its June 9, 1988 
demand. However, following execution of the by-that-time 
expired 1987-88 agreement on January 30, 1989, the 
Association again made written demand, by letter dated 
February 22, 1989, for the commencement of negotiations. A 
subsequent written demand, dated March 17, 1989, was also 
Board - U-10801 
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made by the Association. No written response was ever 
issued. Moreover, in addition to the written requests, the 
Association's president made a number of oral inquiries to 
Thomas Graziano, the Employer's Director of Labor Relations, 
concerning when negotiations wouldcommence, to^hich three 
responses were given: "The County had not picked a chief 
negotiator;" "The negotiations team had not been approved by 
the Board of Legislators;" [and] "They weren't ready". 
According to Graziano, the Employer sought to retain the 
services of an outside negotiator, but those efforts proved 
unsuccessful in March or April 1989. In mid-May 1989, 
Graziano himself was selected chief negotiator, after the 
Employer's previous chief negotiator made the decision to 
retire from his employment. The first negotiating meeting 
took place on May 26, 1989, at which time Graziano informed 
the Association representatives that he had been selected as 
the Employer's chief negotiator. 
DISCUSSION 
The ALJ found that because the Association filed and 
later withdrew an improper practice charge alleging that the 
Employer failed to commence negotiations following its 
June 9, 1988 demand therefor, the propriety of the Employer's 
failure to engage in negotiations from June 1988 until 
February 22, 1989, when a second written demand was made, was 
not properly before her. The ALJ, accordingly, only 
Board - U-10801 
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considered the delay from February 22, 1989 until May 26, 
1989 in reaching her decision to dismiss the charge. 
Although the failure to respond to the June 9, 1988 demand 
may not violate the Act, the fact that a demand was made at 
that time is^pari: of "~th~e—recorcl~"Be"fore^ us^  FoT the purpose 
of establishing a background and context within which to 
consider the reasonableness of the delay from February 22, 
1989 to May 26, 1989, we are permitted, if not required, to 
consider that fact. 
Section 204.3 of the Act requires parties to meet at 
reasonable times to negotiate successor collective bargaining 
agreements. That mandate furthers the Act's policy to 
eliminate or minimize, to the extent possible, the hiatus 
periods between agreements. The reasonableness of the time 
frame between demand and commencement of negotiations is 
judged against the totality of circumstances. For example, a 
delay in negotiations occurring well before the expiration of 
a current agreement may be reasonable, while the same length 
of delay after the expiration of an agreement may be 
unreasonable. 
It is our determination that the Employer unreasonably 
delayed the start of negotiations for a successor to the 
•i/see Act §209.1 which provides that an impasse may be deemed 
to exist if the parties have failed to reach an agreement at 
least 12 0 days before the expiration of the Employer's fiscal 
year even if the parties have not exhausted their efforts to 
negotiate an agreement without third party assistance. 
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1987-88 agreement when measured from February 22, 1989. The 
last agreement had expired five and one half months before 
negotiations began. The Employer was clearly on notice as of 
June 9, 1988 that the Association was prepared to and sought 
to7 engagerin negotiationsHfor an agreement to take effect on 
and after January 1, 1989. The record does not disclose when 
the Employer began preparations for negotiations or, indeed, 
when it began the selection process to retain a chief 
negotiator, although it is clear that by April 1989, those 
efforts had proven unsuccessful. The Employer explains its 
failure to make any appointment until mid-May by indicating 
that its previous chief negotiator had not yet decided 
whether to retire and that it was not until after that 
decision was made that it determined to appoint Graziano as 
its chief negotiator, yet these reasons were never stated to 
the Association. The Employer failed to respond to the 
Association's written demands and gave only vague oral 
explanations to the several Association inquiries. As 
this Board held in Harrison CSD. 7 PERB H3041, aff'q 7 PERB 
K4523 (1974), a two-month delay in responding to a demand to 
negotiate, without adequate explanation, may constitute a 
violation of the duty to negotiate in good faith even when 
made many months before the expiration of an extant 
collective bargaining agreement. In the instant case, more 
than three months elapsed, at a minimum, from the date of 
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demand to the date of commencement of the negotiations and at 
a point when the parties• last agreement had already expired 
following protracted negotiations which did not result in a 
final agreement until one month after the agreement's 
expirationTThese facts/combined with the Employer's 
failure to respond in writing or to give a reasonable oral 
explanation for the delay, establish even more compelling 
circumstances for the finding of a violation than those 
presented in Harrison CSD. 
2/ 
We further reverse the ALT to the extent that her decision 
suggests that the Association was required to establish a 
deliberate attempt to frustrate the negotiations process in order 
to prove a violation of §209-a.l(d) of the Act. A failure to 
respond in an expeditious fashion to a demand to negotiate, to 
provide some reasonable explanation for a delay in response or 
commencement of negotiations, and to select a chief negotiator 
within a reasonable period of time so that negotiations may 
commence, whether intended to frustrate the negotiation process 
^/compare Faculty Association of the Community College of the 
Finger Lakes, 8 PERB 54510, aff'd, 8 PERB 53044 (1975), in 
which a two and one-half month delay immediately prior to the 
expiration of a one-year legislative determination period was 
found not to be unreasonable, given all other circumstances. 
See also, however, New York City Board of Education, 7 PERB 
54507, aff'd, 7 PERB 53022, motion to reconsider denied, 7 
PERB 53039 (1974), wherein the Board found unreasonable a 
two-month delay in the commencement of negotiations for a 
first collective bargaining agreement. 
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or not, has the effect of doing so and constitutes a violation of 
the duty to negotiate in good faith. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Employer: 
1. Will negotiate in good faith with the Association by 
meeting at reasonable times and piaces for the purpose of 
negotiating an agreement with the Association; 
2. Post notice in the form attached at all locations 
customarily used to distribute information to members of the 
Association's bargaining unit. 
DATED: August 16, 199 0 
Albany, New York « 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membfer 
APPENDIX 
TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the unit represented by the Oneida 
County Deputy Sheriff's Benevolent Association that the Sheriff 
and County of Oneida:-
1, Will negotiate in good faith the Association 
by meeting at reasonable times and olaces for 
the purpose of negotiating an agreement with 
) the Association. 
SHERIFF AND COUNTY OF ONEIDA 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LAVERNE PAUL, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-11552 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
Respondent. 
LAVERNE PAUL, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
By decision dated April 24, 1990, the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director) dismissed, 
as deficient, an improper practice charge filed by Laverne 
Paul against the United Federation of Teachers (UFT) which 
alleges that the UFT violated §209-a.2(a) of the Public 
Employees* Fair Employment Act (Act) by refusing to appeal a 
1987 arbitration award which denied a grievance filed by her 
in October 1985. 
The Director dismissed the charge upon the grounds that 
it was untimely filed, and, even if timely filed, fails to 
allege facts which, if proven, would set forth a violation of 
the Act. 
In her exceptions to the Director's dismissal of the 
charge, Paul alleges, for the first time, that "the UFT's 
decision not to appeal the award in my case was arbitrary, 
Board - U-11552 -2 
discriminatory and in bad faith" because during the course of 
the arbitration hearing held in Paul's case, the 
representatives of the Board of Education of the City School 
District of the City of New York (Paul's employer) "were 
allo^wed 15-20 times to be excused in order to prepare their 
case with my UFT advocate's permission each time." Paul also 
alleges that the UFT failed to advise her to seek outside 
legal help, but does not indicate whether the help was to 
have been for her representation at the arbitration or for 
the filing of an appeal from the arbitration award. 
In view of the allegations made by Paul in her charge 
that an arbitration award was issued in her grievance on 
July 30, 1987, and that she immediately thereafter requested 
that the UFT appeal the decision, a request which was denied, 
and that Paul repeated her request for appeal of the 
arbitration award in September 1987, October 1988, February 
1988 and December 1989, and was each time given the same 
negative response, we affirm the Director's decision 
dismissing the charge as untimely. Section 204.1(a)(1) of 
PERB's Rules of Procedure requires that improper practice 
charges be filed within four months of the act or omission 
complained of. The filing of a charge in April 1990, at 
least two and one half years following the first request and 
refusal of an appeal, is not made timely by subsequent 
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repeated requests and denials.-3=/ Paul's allegations in her 
exceptions to the Director's decision, even if originally 
made before the ALJ, that numerous recesses were taken during 
the course of the arbitration hearing held in June 1987 and 
that she was not advised to seek "outside legal help" are 
similarly untimely, and her exceptions with regard to these 
allegations are dismissed accordingly. 
We also concur with the Director's determination that 
the charge fails to allege facts which, if proven, would 
establish a violation of the UFT's duty of fair 
representation under §209-a.2(a) of the Act. As we have 
\ previously held,-2-/ an employee organization has no obligation 
under the Act to institute litigation on behalf of unit 
members in the absence of evidence that it has done so for 
others, and has refused to do so in a particular instance for 
arbitrary, bad faith, or discriminatory reasons. Because no 
such allegations are made here, the charge, even if it were 
timely, would appropriately be dismissed as failing to 
•i/see, e.g. , UFT fDessler) , 16 PERB J[3082 (1983) ; West 
Park UFSD. 11 PERB 53016 (1978). 
^/See PEF (Hartner) , 15 PERB J[3066 (1982); UFT. Local 2 
(Greenberq) , 15 PERB J4591 (1982), aff'd. 16 PERB }[3004 
(1983) . 
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establish any basis upon which a finding of violation of 
§2 09-a.2 (a)-2/ of the Act could be made. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the charge be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: August 16, 1990 
Albany, New York 
**-*~*<l?.foA/Z* 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
alter L. Eisenberg, Membeiv 
•^ /By virtue of L. 1990, ch. 467, effective July 11, 1990, a 
breach of the duty of fair representation constitutes a 
violation of a new §209-a.2(c) of the Act. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF BUFFALO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-10519 
BUFFALO POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION^ 
INC. , 
Respondent. 
SAMUEL HOUSTON, Corporation Counsel (STANLEY J. 
SLIWA, ESQ., of Counsel), for Charging Party 
WYSSLING, SCHWAN and MONTGOMERY (W. JAMES SCHWAN, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the City of 
Buffalo (City) to the dismissal of its improper practice charge 
against the Buffalo Police Benevolent Association, Inc. 
(Association), which alleges that the Association violated §209-
a.2(b) of the Public Employees1 Fair Employment Act (Act) by 
submitting to compulsory interest arbitration eight proposals 
which are nonmandatory subjects of negotiation. 
During the course of proceedings before the assigned 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in this matter, the Association 
withdrew two proposals, identified in the charge as No. 1 and No. 
3, from its petition for interest arbitration, and the City 
accordingly withdrew its charge with respect to those two items. 
The Association also withdrew from its petition for interest 
^ 
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arbitration the proposal identified as No. 2 in the charge. 
However, the City declined to withdraw its charge with regard to 
that proposal. 
Notwithstanding the City * s refusal to withdraw its charge as 
to proposal No . 2 , the ALJ-determined—th-a-t- it was neither 
necessary nor appropriate to issue a determination concerning a 
proposal which had been withdrawn from the petition for interest 
arbitration. In so doing, she distinguished this Board's decision 
in Village of Mamaroneck, 22 PERB ^3029 (1989). There, during the 
pendency of proceedings before the ALJ, the respondent expressed 
its intention to withdraw certain proposals from interest 
arbitration, but had not actually done so, and the charging party 
had refused to withdraw its charge. Although the ALJ determined 
that findings on the purportedly withdrawn proposals were 
unnecessary, he nevertheless made dicta determinations concerning 
the duty to negotiate the at-issue proposals. Upon review, this 
Board held that in view of the dicta determinations made below, 
the parties were entitled to Board review of those determinations 
on their merits, notwithstanding the charging party's decision to 
withdraw the proposals. 
The City argues that the ALJ erred in failing to decide 
whether proposal No. 2 constitutes a mandatory or nonmandatory 
subject of negotiation and whether the Association's inclusion of 
the proposal in its petition for interest arbitration constitutes 
Board - U-10519 
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a violation of §209-a.2(b) of the Act. However, we concur with 
the ALJ's determination that our decision in Village of 
Mamaroneck, supra, is appropriately distinguished on its facts 
from the case before us. 
The circumstances of ^ from 
the facts in City of Schenectady, 21 PERB 53022 (1988), wherein, 
during the course of proceedings before the ALJ, the employee 
organization sought to modify the language of the proposals which 
it had submitted to interest arbitration and which were the 
subject of the employer's improper practice charge. We there held 
that the employer was entitled to a determination as to whether 
the proposals originally submitted by the employee organization 
constituted mandatory or nonmandatory subjects of negotiation 
because these demands were never in fact removed from the table 
and the modifications offered by the employee organization 
constituted, in essence, offers in settlement of the charge which 
were rejected by the employer. In contrast, the Association in 
the instant case has withdrawn proposal No. 2 from interest 
arbitration in its entirety and no purpose is served by our making 
a scope determination at this time. Because the Association has 
withdrawn Proposal No. 2 from its petition for interest 
•i/Proposal No. 2, according to the charge, consists of the 
following: 
Amend Article X, Section 10.1 to provide that the 
Commissioner of Police shall announce all 
assignments to be filled via the police teletype. 
Positions shall be filled on the basis of seniority 
provided the senior applicant had the ability and 
qualifications to perform the work involved. 
Board - U-10519 -4 
arbitration and because there are no special circumstances present 
in this case which would warrant our making a scope determination, 
the City's exception to the ALJ's refusal to issue such a 
determination is denied. 
Proposals 4 through 8, as ""re fer enced in the charge, r eprodxice 
language contained in the parties• expired collective bargaining 
agreement, without change. However, as the AKT found, the 
Association's petition for interest arbitration does not contain 
any demands that the articles in the expired agreement referenced 
by the City in its charge be continued. The City's charge, with 
respect to these proposals, alleges, in essence, that the 
Association has committed an improper practice by implicitly 
seeking to continue allegedly nonmandatory terms of the expired 
agreement, even though no demand for their continuation is 
contained in the petition for interest arbitration. 
2/ 
Because there is no evidence whatsoever that the Association 
has included in its petition for interest arbitration nonmandatory 
•2/Although framed in these terms, the City's charge, as 
litigated and argued, goes not to whether the Association's 
petition for interest arbitration affirmatively includes 
proposals which are nonmandatory subjects of negotiation, but 
whether items in the expired agreement which are not part of 
the petition for interest arbitration automatically continue 
in effect or are automatically eliminated by operation of 
§209-a.1(e) of the Act. As we have done in other cases, we 
decline to rule, in the context of a charge by an employer 
against an employee organization, whether the employer would 
be committing a violation of §209-a.l(e) of the Act if it 
failed to continue the terms of the parties' expired 
agreement following issuance of an interest arbitration award 
because the issue was not properly before us in those cases, 
nor is it properly before us in the instant case. See, e.g. , 
Village of Mamaroneck, supra. 
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subjects of negotiation over the objection of the City, the 
instant charge must be dismissed. This is so even though the 
petition contains some demands, not at issue before us, which 
purport to "amend" articles of the parties1 expired agreement in 
specified respects.The fact that the Association contends that 
items in the expired agreement continue in effect following 
issuance of the interest arbitration award unless modified by the 
award has no bearing upon our disposition of a charge by the City 
alleging that nonmandatory subjects have been submitted, over its 
objection, to interest arbitration, because our review is limited 
to those matters actually placed before the arbitration panel. 
3/ 
Based upon the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that the charge be, 
and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: August 16, 1989 
Albany, New York 
/Harold R. Newman, Chai rman 
Ao^c.7!^ 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
2/Accord,. Village of Dobbs Ferry, 22 PERB ?[3 039 (1989) and 
Village of Mamaroneck, supra. 
